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Abstract: 
The financial crisis in the Eurozone has posed a serious challenge to the viability 
of the existing legal structure, which serves as the grounds for the European 
Union’s (EU) Member States’ economic cooperation. The EU’s financial and 
banking institutions and its decision-making bodies’ failure to predict, and to 
prevent this economic crisis, has led the Union’s decision-makers to conclude that 
they must reinforce the supervisory powers of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The consequent establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism has increased 
ECB’s expectations from the administration of the European banks. However, as 
in any attempt at crisis management, the EU Member States face an important 
question: are the proposed solutions compatible with the existing structures that 
were put in place by current treaties? On the one hand, the European financial 
market’s vulnerability to each Member State’s crises indicates that it requires a 
higher degree of centralization in supervisory matters. On the other hand, all 
Member States, including the non-Eurozone EU Member States, reasonably 
expect that the ECB’s powers be limited to the matters in which they have agreed 
to relinquish their sovereign rights, and that they participate effectively in the 
decision-making process. The final resolution establishing the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism seems to meet some of these expectations. However, questions about 
this mechanism’s compatibility with existing treaties, as well as with EU 
standards for the ECB’s accountability, remain far from being fully resolved.  
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 INTRODUCTION I.
 
Economic integration and financial issues have always been central to 
the European Union’s development. There is no doubt that economic 
interests have been the driving force behind European countries’ 
integration process. It may even be argued that the economic policies’ 
effects have gone far beyond the objectives of economic growth and 
development, influencing all aspects of the EU states and their citizens’ 
lives. One of the encouraging results of economic integration and 
collaboration has been the region’s increased political stability. The 
region had previously been the scene of devastating wars and political 
and economic rivalries.1 On the other hand, these economic incentives 
also have negative consequences. Despite its advantages, the monetary 
union of seventeen European states creates a unique economic 
situation; a financial crisis in any state crosses national boundaries and 
affects all other states of the Union. The current sovereign and private 
sector debt crises in Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, and the attempts 
of economically stable countries (such as Germany and France) to 
rescue them, are the best examples of economic integration’s 
undesirable results. The EU Commission, well aware of these problems, 
has described the debt crisis in the following terms: 
 
Doubts about the sustainability of public debt, economic growth 
prospects, and the viability of credit institutions have been creating 
negative, mutually reinforcing market trends… The situation poses 
specific risks within the euro area, where the single currency increases 
the likelihood that developments in one Member State can create risks 
for economic development and the stability of the Euro area as a 
whole.2 
                                                
1 ‘How the EU Works’ (European Union website) <http://europa.eu/about-eu/> accessed 
28 May 2014. 
2  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation Conferring Specific 
Tasks on the European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential 
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Despite the critical situation that all members of the EU find themselves 
in, the EU and its members are unwilling to withdraw from the path 
they have been on for the past five decades. They are determined to 
overcome the problems they face and have proposed a higher level of 
cooperation and integration. In order to ‘restore confidence in banks 
and in the euro’,3 EU members have introduced the ‘Single Supervisory 
Mechanism’ (SSM), which gives the European Central Bank (ECB) 
significant regulatory and supervisory powers. The SSM decreases 
national financial authorities’ powers and transfers jurisdiction from the 
national level to the Union’s monetary entity. On March 19th 2013, the 
Commission’s proposal for the SSM was adopted by the joint meeting of 
the EU Parliament, the Commission, and the Council of Ministers. On 
September 12th 2013, after a series of consultations and amendments, the 
EU Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on a proposed Council 
regulation. This resolution would confer specific tasks on the ECB with 
regards to policies related to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions. 
 
Despite the severity of the debt crisis and the necessity of concerted 
rescue action by all EU members, it was not easy for the Union to 
finalize the supervisory plan, and its establishment faced some 
substantial challenges. One of the EU States main concerns stems from 
their desire to maintain their internal sovereignty over issues touching 
upon the interests of national businesses. Needless to say, this is not a 
new challenge. Since the Union’s establishment, some Member States 
have been reluctant to transfer their authority to EU institutions, 
although some have also been eager to join the single market of the EU 
zone. In fact, the economic privileges are not enough motivation for 
states to limit their national sovereignty. 4  In the case at hand, the 
German government’s resistance to including its regional bank in the 
SSM sheds light on the problem’s complexity. The Council Regulation 
that conferred specific tasks on the ECB regarding policies on 
prudential supervision of credit institutions establishes the supervisory 
mechanism. It states that banks and financial institutions with assets of 
more than 30 billion euro are under the ECB’s supervision. This means 
                                                                                                                                          
Supervision of Credit Institutions’, COM (2012) 511 final, para 1.2. (‘Commission 
Proposal’). 
3 ibid. 
4 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’ (2011) (October New Left 
Review) <www.newleftreview.org/A2343> accessed 28 May 2014. 
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Germany has used its leverage to limit the ECB’s supervisory 
jurisdiction’s scope, while its government has been a strong proponent 
of the mechanism.5 The British government’s vote against the proposal 
shows its reluctance to be subjected to the ECB’s supervision. The UK 
prefers to protect its central bank’s sovereign rights by limiting them to 
the financial business conducted in London, the financial capital of 
Europe.6 
 
It is also worth noting that the EU’s encroachment upon its Member 
States’ internal sovereignty is not their only concern. Since the Union’s 
foundation, the Member States’ internal affairs have come more and 
more under the control of EU regulations and directives. According to 
statistics, 70% of national agencies that play a significant role in 
European citizens’ everyday lives are affected by the EU’s regulations. 
These regulations, however, have not been subjected to ‘timely and 
careful public opinion or will-formation’ at the national level where 
these regulations’ real effects are felt.7 Thus, the extent to which the 
ECB is held accountable for its actions with regards to the EU’s 
members is highly significant.8 
 
In light of the above-mentioned arguments, this paper intends to 
analyze the legal aspects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
and to consider its positive and negative effects on the EU. However, 
prior to the legal analysis, it is necessary to present an outline of the 
financial crisis the EU is struggling with. Subsequently, the economic 
and financial crisis that has hit Europe in recent years and the 
European Union’s responses to this problem will be discussed first. 
Then, because one of these responses has been the establishment of a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (which is the main focus of this paper), 
ways this plan can help the EU overcome the crisis will be discussed.  
 
                                                
5  Toby Vogel, ‘EU Reaches Deal on Banking Supervision’ (The European Voice) 
<www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/march/eu-reaches-deal-on-banking-
supervision/76697.aspx> accessed 28 May 2014. 
6 House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘European Banking Union: Key 
issues and challenges’, HL 7th Report of Session 2012-2013, Chapter 2 paras 88-7 
(‘HL EU Committee Report on EU Banking Union’) 
7 Habermas (n 4). 
8 Gabriele Steinhauser and Laurence  Norman, ‘Single Supervisor? Not so Fast’ (The 
Real Time Brussels, 27 March 2013) <http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/03/27/single-
supervisor-not-so-fast/> accessed 28 May 2014. 
2014] European Union Towards the Banking Union  96 
 
The majority of this paper will be devoted to arguments about 
difficulties the Union faces with regards to the SSM’s establishment 
within the EU. It is possible to criticize the existing Treaties’ legal 
structure, and there may also be a conflict with the ECB’s mandate. As 
the established entity for carrying out supervisory tasks, the ECB is also 
responsible for setting monetary policies. Therefore, achieving these 
two mandates’ objectives is a concern for some European countries. The 
legal boundaries that are set by EU legal principles—such as equal 
treatment for all EU Member States—are another example of these 
challenges. This may be another obstacle to conferring supervisory 
authority to the ECB, because according to the existing treaties, the 
ECB supervises banks located within the so-called Eurozone. 
 
Another issue that has raised concerns is the mechanism’s 
accountability, which seems difficult to reconcile with the central bank’s 
independence in the EU. The Member States’ concerns, and the 
measures that the Council and the EU Parliament have taken to soothe 
these concerns, will be discussed in detail. 
 
Furthermore the effect the SSM’s establishment has on other agencies 
with similar mandates in the banking sector (ie the European Banking 
Authority) will be discussed. There are similarities in the two agencies’ 
mandates; thus, raising the risk of their mandates overlapping, or of the 
EBA being marginalized as banking supervision becomes centralized. 
Moreover, non-participating Member States will risk being outvoted by 
participating Member States, as the latter will follow the same policy the 
SSM sets for the Eurozone. It is to be noted, however, that, the 
Commission’s proposals have been amended several times since the first 
draft’s publication, and these issues have been addressed as much as 
possible in the latest version adopted by the Parliament. After 
explaining the challenges the EU is struggling with, the most recent 
amendments addressing the above mentioned issues will be discussed in 
this paper. 
 
 HOW DID THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS EMERGE AND WHAT ARE II.
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSES? 
 
Looking back at the history of the financial crisis that hit Europe in 
2008, a long period of credit growth and low risk premiums can be seen. 
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This was the result of prospering economic activity and sufficient 
liquidity in the markets. As the Commission has stated: 
 
Strong leveraging, soaring asset prices and the development of bubbles 
in the real estate sector also shaped this financial situation. Stretched 
leveraged positions and maturity mismatches rendered financial 
institutions very vulnerable to corrections in asset markets, 
deteriorating loan performance and disturbances in the wholesale 
funding markets.9 
 
In response to this situation, banks became worried about their 
counterparts’ creditworthiness. Therefore, the ‘intrabank market 
virtually closed and risk premiums on intrabank loans soared’.10  
 
This caused overall credit conditions to deteriorate, which diminished 
economic activity. Also, the credit market’s sudden collapse left many 
banks unable to repay their loans, thereby forcing governments to 
intervene in the banking sector. This massive transfer of liability 
overwhelmed governments’ balance sheets and resulted in the EU 
Member States’ debt crisis.11 
 
The introduction of the Euro as the common currency for 17 EU 
members and the establishment of the EMU (European Monetary 
Union) are two of the major driving factors in aggravating the crisis. The 
main argument for this idea is the ‘Impossible Trinity’ which consists of 
the ‘absence of co-responsibility for public debt’ 12 , the strict ‘no 
                                                
9 European Commission, ‘Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and 
Responses’ DG Economic and Financial Affairs, (2009) 7 European Economy 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf> 
accessed 28 May 2014, 1-8. 
10 ibid. 
11  Benoite Cœuré, ‘Banking Union and Fiscal Union in Europe: Outlook and 
Implications for Global Partners’ Asia-Europe Economic Forum Conference on 
European Troubles, Bruegel 2013 
<www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130121.en.html> accessed 28 May 2014. 
12 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
[2010] OJ C83/47 (‘TFEU’) art 129(1) and Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank [2008] OJ 
C115/230 art 123. 
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monetary financing’ 13 rule and the interdependence of bank and 
sovereign.14  
 
This Impossible Trinity makes the Euro-area vulnerable to crisis, 
because trouble with sovereign solvency will result in shocks to bank 
solvency. The Central Bank is not empowered to provide liquidity to 
the sovereigns in order to stall the self-feeding debt crises.15 
 
Moreover, by establishing the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
aimed at creating a single currency and a harmonized monetary 
policy, the European Union has not made a common fiscal policy one 
of its mandates. This requires the economically weaker countries to 
deal with the same monetary policy as the strongest, with no means to 
adapt their exchange rate in response to their financial situation. On 
the other hand, deficits in troubled countries may contaminate the 
whole market, as all countries are using the same currency. This was 
one of the main factors in the spread of the crisis among the 
Eurozone Member States.  
 
Analyzing the crisis and its roots requires a deep financial approach, 
which is not feasible within the space of this paper. Leaving this task 
to the financial policy-makers, it should be mentioned that the 
European policy makers responded actively to the management of the 
crisis. 
 
Following the Greek financial rescue package and the establishment 
of the temporary European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) 
and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a number of 
different policy options were discussed. These included how to 
establish financial rescue mechanisms, how to strengthen the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and how to enhance banking supervision 
with the goal of making the banking system more robust in the face of 
sovereign defaults.16 
 
                                                
13 ibid, art 125. 
14 Jean Pisani-Ferri, ‘The Euro Crisis and the New Impossible Trinity’ (2012) Bruegel 
Policy Contribution, 1- 4. 
15 ibid, 9. 
16  Deborah Zandstra, ‘The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and its Evolving 
Resolution’ (2011) 6 (3) Capital Markets L J 285. 
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Moreover, after the Greek debt crisis, some Member States initiated 
austerity measures to meet the requirements for bailout loans so that 
they could receive the loans and overcome financial problems. These 
measures included reducing public pensions and expenditures on 
public services and increasing government revenue by imposing 
higher taxes to compensate for the budget deficit. Over time, these 
measures inflicted severe economic suffering on troubled countries: 
‘they resulted in more unemployment and economic activity, the 
economy of the 17 European Union countries that use the euro 
descended into more recession.’17 
 
As the lender of last resort, the ECB took important standard and non-
standard measures to support the states in crisis by injecting liquidity 
into the market. This was done by giving cheap loans and buying 
governments bonds, and the ECB was criticized repeatedly for acting 
outside of its mandate. One of those measures was the Outright 
Monetary Transactions program, by which the ECB arguably 
circumvented the prohibition against direct government financing by 
the central bank. However, undoubtedly, the ECB efficiently 
ameliorated the crisis, even though its new measures were not 
compatible with its main mandate, which is safeguarding price stability.  
 
On September 12th 2012, the European Commission published three 
documents: a communication entitled ‘A Roadmap towards a Banking 
Union’; a proposal for a Council regulation based on Article 127(6) to 
create the Single Supervisory Mechanism and conferring a central role 
on the ECB; and a proposal for a regulation in the European Parliament 
and the Council amending the 2010 regulation that established the EBA 
to allow for the creation of the SSM. 
  
Finally, at the Euro summit from December 12-14th 2012 in Brussels, the 
roadmap for deepening the economic and monetary union in the 
Eurozone was adopted by the European Council. According to this 
roadmap, financial ministers agreed to the creation of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism as the first step towards building a banking 
union for Europe, shifting the prudential supervisory task to the ECB. 
Negotiations continued through the following weeks, and finally the 
                                                
17  ‘European Leaders Change Views on Austerity’ (CBC News, 15 March 2013) 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2013/03/15/austerity-eu.html> accessed 28 
May 2014. 
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Commission proposal for the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ was 
adopted by the joint session of the Commission, the EU Parliament 
members, and the Council of Ministers on March 19, 2013. Certain issues 
regarding the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the 
ECB’s role at the centre of this mechanism will be addressed in the 
following discussions. 
 
 HOW CAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPRANATIONAL SUPERVISOR III.
BE A SOLUTION TO THE BANKING CRISIS? 
 
In this section, the necessity of establishing the SSM will be considered. 
The EU banking system’s shortcomings, which led to the financial 
crisis, will be discussed, and the ways in which the SSM’s establishment 
will address these deficiencies will be explained. 
 
There are many reasons why a supranational supervisory mechanism for 
European banks is necessary. In fact, the EU has felt the need to break 
the connection between banks and sovereign states since it turned out 
to be impossible for national governments to maintain financial stability 
and market integration. This was because the national authorities lacked 
important information about the activities of financial institutions that 
cross national boundaries. It has also been proven that national states 
are unable to deal with the international crisis, and their policies do not 
provide the solution needed to manage an international financial crisis. 
These rationales will be discussed in detail below. 
 
As the heads of Member States at the September Euro summit 
announced, the Euro crisis revealed the need to break the vicious cycle 
between banks and sovereigns. 
 
This element is visible in increasing debt levels of sovereigns that had to 
provide support for struggling banks as well as losses of banks from 
being exposed to sovereigns under stress. Therefore, there was the need 
to weaken the spillover chain between banks and sovereigns by taking 
responsibility for the stability of the banking system.18 
 
                                                
18 Vitor Constâncio, ‘Establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (The BAFT- 
IFSA 2013 Europe Bank-to-Bank Forum, Frankfurt, 29 January 2013) 
<www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130129_1.en.htmlt > accessed 28 May 2014. 
101  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.7 No.1 
 
There are many ways in which this objective could be better pursued at 
the EU level. The main reason it is necessary to create a banking union 
with a supervisory mechanism at the EU level has to do with the 
importance of financial stability and market integration, which are not 
occurring at the same time at the national level. This is what 
Shoenmaker calls ‘the financial trilemma.’19 This theory suggests that 
policymakers can choose only two of the three following objectives: 
financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies 
(such as bank supervision and resolution). This is because ‘national 
financial policies usually fail to recognize the externality generated by 
cross-border banks in difficulty.’20 In fact, financial integration at the 
EU level gives rise to the supranational interdependence of financial 
agents. Regulating these supranational relations requires extra 
information about the activities of institutions located outside the 
jurisdiction of the national authorities. No national central bank or 
parliament has access to all the required information about financial 
institutions located outside of its territory. However, the activities of 
these banks influence the banking sector and they cannot exercise 
authority over the cross-border financial institution. At the same time, 
the national supervisory institution does not have enough information 
about the financial institutions that are established in its territory, and 
whose activities go beyond national boundaries. Monitoring these 
institutions is difficult for the national mechanisms. Therefore, the 
national authorities are not able to extend robust supervisory 
mechanisms to these cross-border entities, and may provide troubled 
banks across the border with capital flow while having no control over 
the capital injection’s effects.21 Another possibility is that the national 
authorities may not provide enough funds to troubled institutions due 
to a lack of information and control, which in turn leads to financial 
instability. 22  Moreover, national supervisors are more vulnerable to 
regulatory capture. 23  Both of these elements undermine financial 
stability, and therefore, combining these three objectives is not possible 
                                                
19 Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘The Financial Trilemma’ [2011] 111 Economics Letters 57 at p 
58-59. 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 Benoit Cœuré, ‘The Way Back to Financial Integration’ (International Financial  
Integration and Fragmentation: Drivers and Policy Responses Conference, 12 March 
2013) <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130312.en.html> accessed 28 
May 2014. 
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at the national level. In this regard, Benoît Cœuré, member of the ECB’s 
executive board stated that:  
 
‘by setting the incentives correctly, a fully-fledged banking union 
permits an internalization of this externality, making sure that banks 
strengthen their capital and liquidity on sunny days and can continue 
to lend on rainy days.’24  
Additionally, in a highly integrated financial system such as the 
European Union, reducing moral hazard 25  and excessive risk-taking 
requires a consistent set of regulatory incentives, based not only on 
common rules but also on integrated supranational powers in banking 
supervision. Therefore, integration in the banking sector that underlies 
the financial integrated market is necessary to stop reckless risk-taking 
by banks in the internal market.26 
 
Supervision at national levels was fragile during the financial crisis.27 In 
fact, the national banking system preferred to protect national banks in 
crisis, and decided to hide information from the public, which in turn 
resulted in ‘delaying loss recognition’, magnifying the eventual losses.28 
The widespread tendency of national regulators and supervisors to side 
with their troubled banks and to hide information from the public is 
rooted in the intention to protect creditors, shareholders and managers. 
 
 WHY WAS THE ECB CHOSEN TO ACT AS THE SINGLE SUPERVISOR IV.
OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING UNION?  
 
As the Council’s proposals indicate, the SSM will be composed of the 
                                                
24 ibid. 
25 Moral hazard: A situation where a party will have a tendency to take risks because 
the costs that could incur will not be felt by the party taking the risk. In other words 
it is the tendency to be more willing to take a risk, knowing that the potential costs or 
burdens of taking such risk will be borne, in whole or in part, by others. 
26 Zandstra (n 16), 285-316. 
27 Jacopo Carmassi et al, ‘Banking Union: A Federal Model for the European Union 
with Prompt Corrective Action’, (2012) 282 CEPS Policy Briefs 1-6. 
28  Richard J Herring and Charles W Calomiris,  ‘How to Design a Contingent 
Convertible Debt Requirement’ (2013) 25 J of Applied Corporate Finance 
<http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/25.Calomiris_forthcoming.pdf> 
accessed 28 May 2014. 
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European Central Bank and national competent authorities.29 In fact, 
the final regulation states that the supervisory board is composed of the 
ECB Chair, Vice Chair, four other ECB representatives, and a 
representative from each Member State participating in the supervisory 
mechanism.30 However, the question remains: why was the ECB chosen 
by European authorities to play such an important role in the future 
banking union? 
 
First, one of the policy makers’ main concerns was avoiding the lengthy 
treaty amendment process. In fact, if they decided to create a new 
institution, they would have been left with no choice other than to 
introduce a new treaty. However, at the height of the crisis, the Union 
needed to take corrective actions in a timely manner, as treaty 
amendment - from writing the preliminary draft to ratifying the final act 
by the national authorities - takes a long time, allowing the crisis to 
deteriorate. As article 127(6) TFEU recognizes the ECB’s supervisory 
powers over the EU’s financial institutions, EU Member States believe 
that it is not necessary to ratify a new treaty to establish the legal basis 
for the prudential supervisory tasks that are to be assigned to the ECB 
in 2014. It is also worth noting that some EU members, including 
Germany, at first believed that the existing legal basis provided by EU 
treaties falls short of the SSM’s demands, and that treaty amendment is 
inevitable.31 The UK Parliament holds the same opinion, although the 
UK has voted against the mechanism.32 Recently, the German policy has 
changed. Although Germans still believe that treaty change is essential, 
they have agreed to the establishment of the mechanism within the 
current legal regime in order to respond to the crisis in a timely manner. 
                                                
29 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Agrees Position on Bank Supervision’, 
Press Release, December 2012  
<www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/134265.pdf > 
accessed 28 May 2014. 
30  Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to  the prudential supervision of credit institutions’ 2013, 
not yet published in the Official Journal  
<www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201309/20130912ATT71209/2013091
2ATT71209EN.pdf> accessed 26 September 2013 (‘Council Regulation on Conferring 
Tasks’), art 19. 
31 Jim Brunsden, ‘EU Set to Clash on Bank Deal as Germany Sees Treaty Limit’ 
(Bloomsberg Business Week, April 2013) <www.businessweek.com/news/2013-04-13/eu-
set-to-clash-on-bank-deal-as-germany-sees-treaty-limit> accessed 28 May 2014. 
32 HL EU Committee Report on EU Banking Union (n 6). 
2014] European Union Towards the Banking Union  104 
 
They still believe that treaty amendments should be made in the future. 
Yet, in their view, resolution of the financial crisis through the SSM is 
now more important than the existing treaties’ inconsistency with the 
supervision mechanism: ‘The need for urgent reactions to the crisis 
especially after Cyprus bailouts in March 2013, and the long process of 
making amendment in EU treaties is the reason of this policy change.’33 
 
Alternatively, Berlin has proposed a two-stage plan in which treaty 
change is at first not a requirement. Instead, the ‘network of national 
authorities’ will start after three conditions are met: first, the new EU 
supervisor is operational; second, EU banks are fully capitalized to Basel 
III levels; and third, new standards are agreed upon for national 
resolution authorities and funds. 
 
The other reason for choosing the ECB as supervisors is that, according 
to Art 127(1) TFEU, the ECB’s primary mandate is to preserve price 
stability, and the most important tool the ECB has to achieve this 
objective is defining and applying monetary policy for Eurozone 
members. It is arguable that ‘this responsibility for monetary policy 
creates for the central bank an intrinsic and deep interest in a stable 
functioning system.’34 In other words, ‘confidential information on the 
health of the banking system is useful in predicting inflation and 
unemployment’, and therefore, in adopting a monetary policy in 
accordance with the needs of the system.35 The debt crisis is the best 
example of the effects the banking system’s instability has on the euro’s 
value and on price stability. EU Member States and financial institutions 
are supposed to conduct their business with one common currency and 
each state is individually in charge of banking supervision. In this 
context, it is not plausible to imagine that all of these separate financial 
policies could lead to the emergence of one common framework 
guaranteeing the EU monetary system’s stability without the 
intervention of a supranational institution. In other words, without the 
single supervisory scheme, the ECB is obliged to carry out a task for 
                                                
33 Peter Spiegel, ‘Schäuble Warns EU Bank Rescue Agency Needs Treaty Changes’ 
(Financial Times, May 2013) <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/366eff18-bb03-11e2-b289-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2VkzXp73N > accessed 28 May 2014. 
34 Constâncio (n 18). 
35 Vasso Ioannidou, ‘A First Step Towards a Banking Union’ in Thorsten Beck (ed) 
Banking Union for Europe Risks and Challenges (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Tilburg University 2012) available at 
<www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/Banking_Union.pdf> accessed 5 June 2014, 90. 
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which it does not have the necessary means. The Commission has 
presented the same argument in defence of the proposal for the SSM. It 
states: 
 
The objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved by the EU. 
Recent events have clearly demonstrated that only supervision at the 
European level can ensure appropriate oversight of an integrated 
banking sector and a high level of financial stability in the EU and the 
Euro area in particular. The provisions of this proposal do not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued. The ECB is 
entrusted with the supervisory tasks, which need to be exercised at EU 
level to ensure uniform and effective application of prudential rules, 
risk control and crisis prevention. National authorities will continue to 
carry out certain tasks, which can be better performed at national 
level.36 
 
On the other hand, conferring supervisory competence on the ECB will 
help it fulfil its central banking duties; a central bank, as ‘the lender of 
last resort’, should be able to provide a huge amount of money in a 
short period of time during crises. In order to do this, the central bank 
must know the banks’ financial situations. Therefore, equipping it with 
supervisory authorities is undoubtedly beneficial, given that information 
submitted to the ECB by other institutions is not sufficiently reliable, as 
they are not responsible for the EU zone’s financial stability and their 
actions are not motivated by the same incentive.37 
 
 WHAT TASKS ARE CONFERRED ON THE ECB? V.
 
As mentioned earlier, implementing the new roadmap will shift specific 
supervisory tasks to the Union level in the Euro area, notably those that 
are key to preserving financial stability and detecting risks to banks’ 
viability. The ECB will become responsible for tasks such as authorizing 
credit institutions, compliance with capital, leverage and liquidity 
requirements, and supervising financial conglomerates. The ECB will be 
able to intervene early by requiring banks to take remedial action when 
they breach or risk breaching regulatory capital requirements.38 
                                                
36 Commission Proposal (n 2), 2. 
37 Ioannidou (n 35), 92. 
38 European Commission, ‘Commission Proposes New ECB Powers for Banking 
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Prior to the Council’s adopting of the SSM, the legal basis for 
conferring tasks of prudential supervision to the ECB was article 127(6) 
TFEU. Since the March 19th 2013, the Council Directive has been 
another legal document establishing supervisory jurisdiction. Therefore, 
in addition to pursuing its primary mandate of maintaining price 
stability by defining and applying monetary policy within the Eurozone, 
the ECB’s mandate will be extended to preserving financial stability 
through prudential supervisory mechanisms. 
 
According to article 4(1)(a) to (k) of the Regulation, the ECB will be given 
‘exclusive competence’ for a specific list of key supervisory tasks 
contemplated by the CRD IV package, including: authorizing and 
licensing credit institutions, assigning acquisitions and disposals of 
holdings in credit institutions, ensuring compliance with the EU capital, 
liquidity and related requirements. In particular cases, these tasks will 
also include the following setting higher or additional requirements; 
applying capital buffers; overseeing robust and sound internal 
governance; internal assessment and risk management arrangements; 
strategies; processes and mechanisms, carrying out stress tests; 
conducting consolidated supervision; participating in supplementary 
supervision of financial conglomerates, and carrying out supervisory 
tasks related to early intervention (in coordination with national 
resolution authorities). 
 
Under the Commission’s proposal, the ECB’s list of ‘exclusive competences’ 
would also have extended to coordinating and expressing the common 
position of the competent authorities of Member States participating in 
EBA decision-making contexts on issues related to tasks conferred on the 
ECB. The other difference between the Council and the Commission’s view 
of the list of tasks entrusted to the ECB is that under the Council’s proposal, 
it is the national authorities – not the ECB – that have the power to apply 
capital buffers and other macro-prudential tools. The reason for this 
division of tasks can be seen from the Council’s point of view: The national 
authorities are in a better position to assess the specific circumstances faced 
by local financial systems. Meanwhile, national authorities have to duly 
consider any objections from the ECB. Furthermore, if necessary, the ECB 
has the power to apply higher capital buffers and more stringent macro-
prudential measures than those applied by national authorities. 
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<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-953_en.htm> accessed 28 May 2014. 
107  European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.7 No.1 
 
According to the Council’s amendments, national supervisors would 
remain in charge of tasks not conferred on the ECB, for instance, those 
related to consumer protection, money laundering, payment services, 
and branches of third country banks. The EBA would retain its power to 
further develop the single rulebook and ensure convergence and 
consistency in supervisory practice, which will be discussed shortly. 
 
 THE ECB’S NEW MANDATE AND ITS CHALLENGES VI.
  
In the previous sections, the practicality of choosing the ECB as the 
single supervisor of the EU banking system was discussed, as was the 
existing treaties’ compatibility with the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 
with the ECB having the mandate to preserve price stability and set 
monetary policies according to the treaties. However, now that EU 
members are determined to enforce such a drastic change in the ECB’s 
structure and mandate, consequences are inevitable. These challenges 
will be briefly discussed in this section, and the resolutions proposed by 
EU bodies in response to these concerns will be presented. 
 
First of all, when the Commission proposed the SSM, there were 
concerns about the hazards of bringing monetary policy and prudential 
supervision together. The fear was that a ‘central bank’s concern for the 
health of banks jeopardizes its price stability objective.’ 39  Also, 
conducting monetary policy could affect the central bank’s supervisory 
responsibilities. A good example of this can be seen during recessions, 
when instead of putting pressure on credit institutions and making 
credit conditions more demanding, central banks would lower 
supervision to support monetary policy objectives. In the case of the 
recent financial crisis, some experts believe that central banks are 
tempted to provide crisis-ridden banks with funds as they try to prevent 
the financial system’s collapse. Yet, such a lax monetary policy can lead 
to ‘generating an inflationary bias impairing its credibility, and also 
contribut[ing] to more risk-taking by banks (moral hazard), and in turn 
breed[ing] future financial instability.’40 
 
                                                
39 Carmassi (n 27). 
40  Benoit Cœuré, ‘Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision’ (‘Central Banking: 
Where Are We Headed?’ Symposium in honor of Stefan Gerlach’s contribution to 
the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Frankfurt, February 2013)  
<www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130207.en.html> accessed 28 May 2014. 
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EU legislators have not disregarded this potential conflict. In the 
proposal the Commission stressed the importance of exercising these 
two functions separately. 41  To properly divide the tasks, the 
Commission’s proposal has created a supervisory board within the ECB, 
whose role is to plan and execute the supervisory tasks conferred on the 
ECB. The Council draft, on the other hand, conferred the responsibility 
of preparing supervisory tasks on the supervisory board and their 
adoption on the ECB’s governing council.42 
 
Some critics regard the structure and legality of these bodies with 
suspicion. However, the key point is that the difficulty of the tasks 
conferred on the ECB is still a matter that is up for discussion, 
notwithstanding the structure of the decision-making process that the 
Commission and Council have proposed. Even though a special body is 
in charge of preparing decisions related to supervision, in the end, 
decisions will not be adopted if the governing council objects. The 
governing council, which is the decision-making body of the ECB, is 
primarily responsible for formulating monetary policy for the Eurozone 
Member States. Therefore, the division of tasks between supervisory 
measures and monetary policymaking is not guaranteed under the 
current legislation. 
 
One of the main criticisms of conferring supervisory tasks on the ECB 
has to do with the conflict of interest that arises from the tension 
between the adoption of monetary policy and the exercise of macro 
prudential supervision. The Commission’s opinion was that special 
bodies should be designated for decision-making. However, the Council 
has amended this resolution to create more equal rights for those 
Member States who are outside of the banking system. 
 
In this regard, the Commission’s proposal anticipated the 
establishment of a supervisory board in the ECB. This board 
consisted of representatives from all participating Member States 
who would have the power to make supervisory decisions and 
carry out tasks of prudential supervision. 43  The Governing 
Council, or the ECB’s decision-making body would still have been 
in charge of making decisions, but the Commission has envisioned 
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42 Council Regulation on Conferring Tasks (n 30). 
43 ibid, art 19. 
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the possibility of delegating ‘clearly defined supervisory tasks and 
related decisions’ about an individual institution or set of 
institutions to the Supervisory Board under the Governing 
Council’s authority. 44 
 
According to the Council’s proposal, the supervisory board will carry 
out preparatory supervisory tasks and propose draft decisions, which 
will be formally adopted by the Governing Council. The definition of 
participating Member States also includes those non-Eurozone 
members that have entered into close cooperation with the SSM. 45 
However, the Council’s text does not delegate tasks and related 
decisions about specific institutions from the Governing Council to the 
Supervisory Board. The Governing Council is in charge of making final 
decisions that are prepared by the supervisory board. 
 
Critics consider this close relationship between the Governing Council 
and the supervisory board (more precisely, the dependence of the latter 
on the former) problematic. As the Governing Council’s primary 
responsibility is to formulate monetary policy,46 granting the Governing 
Council exclusive decision-making power ‘appears to breach the ring-
fence that should be maintained between supervision and monetary 
policy.’ 47  There are also some concerns about the impracticality of 
multiple layers of governance arrangements, keeping in mind the 
members of the Governing Council’s expertise and qualifications in 
setting monetary policy.48 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that while TFEU and ECB statutes 
authorize the Governing Council and the executive board of the ECB to 
conduct monetary policy, 49  no equivalent institutional structure is 
provided in legal texts for the ECB’s supervisory tasks. Therefore: 
 
Establishment of a new body with wide discretionary decision making 
                                                
44 Commission Proposal (n 2), art 19(3). 
45 Council Regulation on Conferring Tasks (n 32), arts 1(1) and 19(1). 
46 ibid, art 12. 
47 Ellis Ferran and Valia SG Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ 
(2013) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper 10/2013, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224538 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2224538> accessed 
26 September 2013, 14. 
48 ibid. 
49 TFEU (n 12), art 9(3). 
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powers such as the supervisory board can reasonably be considered to 
be a step beyond the modalities of internal organization. That the space 
for institutional creativity does not extend that far appears to be the 
reasoning behind the approach followed by the Commission and the 
Council; Indeed the Council has been more conservative in its views 
than the Commission, because its text does not allow for the delegation 
of specifically defined supervisory tasks.50  
 
Similarly, even a secret opinion from the EU Council’s top legal advisor 
revealed by the Financial Times shows that the plan goes ‘beyond the 
powers permitted under law to change governance rules at the 
European Central Bank, and without altering EU treaties it would be 
impossible to give a bank supervision board within the ECB any formal 
decision making power suggested by the Council.’51 
 
 THE SCOPE OF THE SSM AND ITS CHALLENGES  VII.
 
Another crucial criticism of the Commission’s proposal for establishing 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism is that this mechanism’s scope may 
threaten the internal market’s integrity and the equal treatment of the 
states within and outside of the Eurozone. There is also disagreement 
on the type and number of financial and credit institutions that the SSM 
should have authority over in those states that are already Eurozone 
members. The Commission has amended its proposal to compensate for 
problems arising due to the SSM’s scope. 
 
In terms of scope, the most important point is that the Supervisory 
Mechanism, as the Lisbon Treaty (articles 127-133) states, is responsible 
for supervising the banking systems of those Member States whose 
currency is the Euro. Therefore, the Council and the Commission’s 
legislative texts do not provide for the ECB’s supervision of non-
Eurozone Member States. However, the Council’s proposal provides for 
cooperation arrangements with limited participation rights in the SSM, 
and this is bolstered by the Council, as the unequal treatment of non-
Eurozone Member States in the former is partially remedied by the 
latter. The treatment of the ins and outs of the SSM’s proposed design 
will be discussed in further detail, but for now it is important to point 
                                                
50 Ferran and Babis (n 47). 
51 Alex Barker, ‘Europe Banking Supervisor Plan Illegal’ (The Financial Times, October 
2012) <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d62db344-179f-11e2-9530-
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out the risk of fragmenting the internal market that may be caused by the 
non-unified model of banking system supervision among Member States. 
It is argued that this division between participating states and states that 
opt out of the mechanism is not covered by the Treaty. Article 127(6), 
which grants the ECB supervisory powers, is not restricted to the 
Eurozone and may therefore apply to all Union members because the 
transitional provisions of Article 139(2c) make it explicit that Article 
127(6) is not subject to provisional measures and Member States are not 
allowed to deviate from the rule in Article 127(6). In other words, under 
the Treaty, the ECB is a Union institution, while restricting its monetary 
functions to certain Member States is a ‘temporary’ situation permitted 
by the deviation from treaty obligations. The Roadmap called for ‘an 
integrated financial framework that covers all EU Member States, whilst 
allowing for specific differentiations between Euro and non-Euro area 
Member States; but it is neither consistent with this objective nor the 
common European objective of preserving the internal market.’52 
 
As previously mentioned, the SSM was introduced as the supervisor of 
banks within the Euro area. However, Member States whose currency is 
not the euro are also invited by the Commission proposal to participate 
in close cooperation agreements with the SSM. The Commission 
proposal included some unequal elements with respect to non-
Eurozone members that voiced their discontent and their reluctance to 
cooperate with the system. For example, a Member State that enters into 
a close cooperation agreement with the SSM is bound to bring its 
national regulations in line with the ECB’s guidelines and instructions 
and provide information requested by the ECB. It must also agree to 
adopt national legal acts to ensure that its bank prudential supervisor 
will be obliged to adopt any measures the ECB requests in relation to 
credit institutions. The ECB can decide to terminate close cooperation 
but the Member State has no such right. Most importantly, articles 19(1) 
and 19(5) of the Commission’s proposal limit the supervisory board’s 
decision-making authority to participating Member States. Obviously, 
the fact that the proposal did not recognize the right of these states to 
participate in supervisory board activities and did not provide any 
incentive for EU members to join the SSM means it would not help to 
reach the objective of financial integration and stability. 
 
In order to help reach its objectives, the Council agreed to make some 
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amendments to the Commission’s draft. It decided to assign every 
participant Member State a seat on the supervisory board, and to grant 
them equal voting rights in preparing drafts of decisions. It has left the 
task of adopting these decisions to the Governing Council as provided 
by ECB regulations. Other than the aforementioned doubts about the 
legality of establishing a new board within the ECB’s institutional 
framework, the non-Eurozone members’ concerns do not seem to have 
been alleviated yet. 
 
The Governing Council of the ECB is composed of the ECB’s six-
member executive board and the governors of the participating national 
central banks, and there are no voting rights for national competent 
authorities whose currency is not the euro. This resulted in further 
dissatisfaction among some officials involved in the talks who were 
‘unimpressed with the prospect of voting powers for a committee that 
cannot take decisions, arguing it fell well short of a realistic political 
solution.’53 
 
A number of safeguards have been prepared to compensate for the non-
Eurozone Member States’ lack of decision-making authority on the 
governing council. First, the supervisory board’s draft decisions are 
communicated to the Member States concerned. If one Member State 
objects to the decision, the governing council will invite that Member 
State’s representative to the meeting. Also, all Member States may 
appeal to the European Court of Justice. In any case, contrary to the 
Commission’s proposal, which only provided the ECB with the right to 
terminate cooperation,54 the right to exit the cooperation agreement is 
provided for Member States under certain circumstances. 55  The 
expedited exit procedure provided in article 6(6abb) of the Council’s 
regulation applies in those situations where a non-Euro area country 
has a major objection to a supervisory decision impacting the country. 
These safeguards are only intended to be used in ‘duly justified, 
exceptional cases.’ However, the regulatory bodies may only extend 
participation rights to non-Eurozone Member States this far under the 
existing legal framework, and the decision-making right of states which 
intend to participate in the system cannot be afforded due to legal 
obstacles. 
                                                
53 ibid. 
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55 Council Regulation on Conferring Tasks (n 30), art 6(6). 
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Moreover, some non-Euro area Member States were concerned that 
centralizing macro-prudential tools in the ECB would prevent them 
from taking appropriate macro-prudential regulatory action in response 
to issues specific to countries outside the Euro area, especially with 
regards to capital buffers. The Council’s regulation in response to this 
concern gives national regulators wide discretionary power, and gives 
the ECB no authority to block their measures.56 Meanwhile, the ECB 
can apply more stringent requirements for capital buffers to Euro area 
Member States. This seems to violate the EU’s legal principle of equal 
treatment; setting regulations that better serve countries out of the area 
sounds ‘counter intuitive’57 and raises the question of whether or not a 
safeguard against unequal treatment and an incentive for tying Europe 
to a plan to make a more robust union justifies differential treatment. 
 
Amongst Eurozone Member States, the SSM’s scope is still a source of 
disagreement between the mechanism’s proponents and some Member 
States. Supervisory authority, as established by the Commission’s 
proposal on the prudential supervision of all credit institutions 
established in Member States whose currency is the Euro, is conferred 
on the ECB.58 Germany first raised the idea of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism59 because it was not satisfied with bailing countries out of 
debt when they failed to abide by the fiscal compact and endangered 
financial stability within the Union. The mechanism was originally 
designed for a banking system in which there was supervision at the EU 
level. On the other hand, the German Chancellor did not agree with the 
scope of the supervision the Commission proposed, which France and 
the ECB advocated. The German government believes that national 
Member States should still bear the responsibility of day-to-day 
supervision of the smaller banks, leaving only large banks under the 
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ECB’s direct supervision.60 The Council adopted the German point of 
view and narrowed the scope of the SSM’s supervision to banks whose 
total assets (balance sheet) were more than €30 billion, whose assets 
exceeded 20% of the GDP of the Member State of establishment 
participating in the SSM, unless the total value of these assets was 
below €5 billion, or credit institutions considered by the competent 
national authority to be significant to the national economy. In addition, 
‘unless justified by particular circumstances,’ the ECB will directly 
supervise the three most significant credit institutions of each 
participating state. Although the day-to-day supervision of less 
significant banks is left to national authorities, according to the 
Roadmap the ECB would still be ultimately responsible for the Union’s 
financial stability, which would include these banks. In addition, the 
ECB would have been given supervisory authority and power to pre-
emptively intervene with all banks.61 
 
The reason for this narrowing lies in concern over the ECB’s capacity to 
manage the prudential supervision of 6200 banks and institutions in the 
Eurozone.62 It can also be regarded as questioning the sovereignty of 
Member States, with a view that centralizing the oversight of banks 
violates the Member States’ sovereign rights. This interference with 
sovereignty should be minimized as much as possible. As a case in 
point, to ensure that financial institutions meet the required standards, 
the ECB is entitled to pre-emptively intervene and require institutions 
to execute its directives. These micro-level interventions can overlap 
with the national authorities’ powers.63 However, Member States that 
                                                
60 Valentina Pop, ‘Banking Union: The German Way or No Way’ (EU Observer, 10 
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use the common currency have already voluntarily surrendered their 
monetary sovereignty to the Union level,64  and in keeping with the 
previous changes and the creation of the EMU, further centralization 
appears to be the only way to escape the crisis at this level. 
 
One of the major concerns, stemming from the two-level supervisory 
design the Council proposes, is that the ‘allocation of supervision of less 
significant banks to national authorities or the outsourcing of labour 
from the ECB to national authorities may not afford the ECB with 
sufficient visibility of emerging problems quickly enough for timely 
intervention.’65 Therefore, the home bias that can lead to supervisory 
forbearance will not be eliminated, and that was one of the main 
objectives of establishing a supervisory mechanism at the EU level. Thus 
the only resolution the Council proposes is that the ECB be in charge of 
issuing regulations, guidelines and general instructions to guide 
supervision by national authorities. Furthermore, the ECB retains some 
direct supervisory powers with regards to ‘less significant’ banks. These 
include bank authorizations and withdrawal of authorization, 
assessment of acquisitions and disposal of holdings.66 
 
Additionally, the ECB’s initial remit will not extend to insurers, 
investment firms, central counterparties, other providers of market 
infrastructure or entities engaged in ‘shadow banking’ activities. This is 
due to the fact that Article 127(6) TFEU only allows for the ECB to be 
conferred with tasks related to credit institutions and other financial 
institutions while insurance undertakings are specifically excluded. This 
issue is a matter of questioning the system, as these institutions’ 
functions pose a risk to the whole mechanism. However, extending the 
system’s remit to include these bodies is not possible within the current 
treaty’s framework and requires treaty amendment. Since the 
amendment process is normally lengthy, it is not possible to predict 
whether or not these institutions’ activities will be covered by the ECB’s 
supervisory jurisdiction. 
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 THE IMPACT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SSM ON OTHER EU VIII.
INSTITUTIONS (THE EBA) 
 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) is established by Regulation 
(EU) 1093/2010. It is in charge of writing non-binding guidelines and 
recommendations, conducting peer reviews, mediating disputes 
between supervisors on a non-binding basis, promoting supervisory 
cooperation, convergence and coordination, facilitating home/host 
Member State relations, and providing opinions to Union Institutions. 
 
Therefore, it could be anticipated that centralizing banking supervision 
in the Eurozone would have an effect on the EBA. For this reason, 
when the Commission issued the single supervisory proposal, it also 
proposed an amendment to the EBA’s regulation. First of all, there is 
the risk of conflict and overlap between the two bodies’ mandates with 
respect to rule-making power, which both the EBA and the ECB enjoy. 
In recital 26 of the ECB’s regulation, the Commission confines the 
ECB’s exercise of its rule-making powers to situations in which the 
EBA’s technical standards are not detailed enough to provide for the 
ECB’s functions. Moreover, the ECB is to develop a ‘supervisory 
manual’ for national authorities under its remit, while the EBA is 
responsible for developing the single supervisory handbook for the 
entire Union. Ferran argues that ‘[u]navoidably, the larger degree of 
supervisory convergence within the SSM will call for arrangements 
different from those that are applied at EU27 level.’67 Therefore, the 
mandate of each should be more precisely determined and the ECB’s 
impact on the EBA should not be underestimated. 
 
One major concern of non-participating Member States regarding the 
SSM’s establishment and its effect on EBA is the risk that non-
Eurozone states may be outvoted by SSM Member States that follow the 
same policy: 
 
Authorities of the SSM Member States that vote in the EBA’s Board of 
Supervisors may retain their autonomy, but in practice, it is likely that 
coordination will be sought in a manner that their votes are in line with 
policies adopted by the SSM as a whole.68 
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It is predictable that: 
 
Eurozone national authorities will increasingly coalesce around a 
common position as the ECB puts its stamp on Euro Area supervisory 
practices, procedures, policies, and philosophies, since this growing 
uniformity can be expected to spill over into regulatory thinking as 
well.69 
 
This raises the risk that non-Eurozone Member States may be outvoted 
by SSM Member States in EBA decision-making in cases that require 
simple majority in Articles 41 and 44 of the EBA’s regulation. This 
includes decisions about breach of law, settlement of disagreements, 
and the election of the Management Board. Thus, the Commission 
proposed an independent panel to take charge of decision-making, 
whose decisions are to be adopted unless rejected by at least three votes 
from participating Member States and three from non-participating 
Member States. Under the Council’s regulation the independent panel 
consists of seven members, which do not represent the authorities 
concerned and which do not have any interest in the case. There is no 
minimum number of panel members from non-participating member 
States. In Article 1(7a), the Council introduces a new provision that the 
Board of Supervisors of EBA shall strive for consensus when making its 
decision, notwithstanding the voting arrangements set out for the EBA 
in this Regulation. 
  
However, decisions about technical standards continue to be made by 
Qualified Majority Voting. In the Council’s regulation, meeting the 
QMV requirement calls for at least a simple majority from 
representatives of participating Member States and a simple majority 
from representatives of non-participating Member States. 
 
The Commission’s proposal also emphasizes the EBA’s power to resolve 
cross-border disputes between supervisors. According to the proposal, 
the EBA’s decisions are not binding on the ECB, although it has to 
show proper justification in case of non-compliance.70 This regulation 
again casts doubt on the equality of Ins and Outs, but it was not 
possible to eliminate inequality because of the principle of the ECB’s 
independence, which is found in TFEU Article 130 and which prohibits 
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the ECB from taking instructions from EU institutions or bodies. 
Therefore, Eurozone Member States are in a better position than non-
Euro Member States when it comes to compliance with EBA 
instructions, due to the ECB’s independence. 
 
Generally, it has been argued the ECB’s emergence as a powerful 
coordinating force in supervision could still have disturbing long term 
implications for the EBA, notwithstanding all the required amendments 
with respect to equal treatment and preventing mandates from 
overlapping. Rather than being a crucial single market cohesion 
mechanism, the EBA itself may become marginalized. 71  In order to 
prevent this, certain organizational and structural amendments must be 
made to ensure that the EBA can operate effectively when the interests 
of Member States participating in the SSM diverge from those of 
Member States, which do not join the SSM. Therefore, legislative 
proposals need to provide more guarantees for the two institutions’ 
coexistence and their successful operation in their own remit. 
 
These guarantees seem to be provided in the latest draft of a proposed 
amendment to EBA regulation adopted by the EU Parliament, 
according to these amendments:  
 
The EBA Regulation will ensure that the EBA can continue to fulfil its 
mission effectively as regards all Member States. In particular, the EBA 
is enabled to exercise its powers and tasks not only vis-à-vis national 
supervisors but also vis-à-vis the ECB as a European institution. Voting 
arrangements that ensure that the EBA decision-making structures 
continue to be balanced and effective and preserve the interests of all 
its members will be adopted as well.72 
 
 IS THE SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM ADEQUATELY IX.
INDEPENDENT AND ACCOUNTABLE? 
 
The SSM’s effects on the Central Bank’s independence, which has been 
provided for in Article 130 TFEU, have led scholars to question the 
wisdom of conferring supervisory authority to the ECB. Whether or not 
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the SSM meets the accountability requirement is another major concern 
for European countries, since the ECB’s new mandate requires a higher 
level of accountability. The new initiative may cause conflict between 
these two issues, and the important question is how to strike a balance 
between them. The Commission has taken measures to address the 
accountability concerns in its proposal and in forthcoming 
amendments. These concerns and measures are discussed below. 
 
The second of the Basel Committee’s core principles for effective 
banking supervision recognizes operational independence, transparent 
processes, sound governance, adequate resources, and accountability as 
the essential parameters for central banking systems.  
 
Safeguarding the ECB’s independence from any other union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and any government of a 
Member State is a principle laid out in Article 130 of TFEU. The ECB’s 
independence has been strongly emphasized since its establishment, 
and as a result, the reporting requirements and general accountability of 
the ECB were limited. The ECB was following the German Bundesbank 
and became one of the most independent central banks in the world.73 
 
The Commission’s proposal restates the guarantee of the ECB’s 
independence in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (Article 16 of the 
ECB regulations). This may seem controversial with respect to tasks 
conferred on the ECB under the new supervisory mechanism, since the 
new mandate requires a substantial level of accountability to provide for 
the objectives of effective banking supervision for the Euro area. This is 
not comparable to the degree of accountability required for setting 
monetary policy. Therefore, creating the SSM necessitates a shift in the 
ECB’s accountability to national and Union authorities.74 
 
The new legal framework should provide a balance between independence 
and accountability for the ECB in the new context. The question is, to 
what extent have the proposals been successful in achieving this aim? 
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The Commission proposal has made the SSM accountable to the 
European Parliament, and to the Council. It also requests annual 
reports to the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the 
Eurogroup. It gives European Parliament committees the power to 
require the Chair of the Supervisory Board to appear before them, and 
it imposes an obligation on the ECB to respond to questions put 
forward by the European Parliament or the Eurogroup.75 In addition to 
these grounds, the Commission’s proposal has added reporting 
requirements for evaluating supervisory fees. It has also obliged the 
Chair of the Supervisory Board to appear before the Eurogroup and the 
representatives of non-Euro participating Member States upon their 
request. Finally, it requires the European Court of Auditors to take the 
supervisory tasks conferred upon the ECB into account when examining 
the operational efficiency of the ECB’s management.76 
 
Since the supervisory authority has been transmitted to the Union level 
in the new plan, the Commission paid attention to the ECB’s 
accountability at that level as well, resulting in a lack of accountability 
for the ECB at the national level. The Council’s regulation, on the other 
hand, has filled this gap by requiring the ECB to forward annual reports 
to the members’ national parliaments. Also, according to the Council’s 
regulation, Member States’ national parliaments can request Member 
States to respond to their observations and questions when they are 
sent to them. Moreover, a national parliament may invite the Chair or a 
member of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views 
with a representative of the national competent authority.77 
 
As it has been illustrated, national parliaments can still be involved in 
bank supervision in the future; however, this will impose a more 
indirect form of accountability compared to their authority over the 
national supervisory institutions. Therefore, the Member States are left 
with no option other than to surrender their sovereignty and transfer 
competence to the supranational level within the Union. Specifically, 
the ECB’s measures related to individual supervision decisions have a 
significant impact on an individual Member State’s banking sector, and 
therefore decisions should be made based on a high degree of 
credibility with respect to national authorities. What has been provided 
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so far is indirect accountability to governments of the Member States.  
The ‘transfer of the competence from the national to the Union level 
without transferring the accountability’78 was a source of concern for the 
European Member States. This concern has been addressed in the latest 
agreement between members of the European parliament and the 
Council’s joint session. The agreements include amendments on a 
variety of aspects of democratic accountability. 
 
First, a stronger accountability mechanism was developed through the 
co-appointment and dismissal of the chair and vice-chair by the EP, as 
well as by the European Parliament providing better access to 
information. Also the new deal gives a more powerful role to the 
national parliaments. Another improvement is that it provides ‘better 
access to documents for the EU supervisory authorities vis-à-vis banks 
and for the EP and national parliaments vis-à-vis the EU supervisor 
authorities’ 79 . Moreover, this agreement also divides staff between 
monetary policy and supervision and ensures the accountability of the 
ECB’s supervisory arm, as well as strengthening the EBA in relation to 
the ECB to obtain information.80 
 
Democratic accountability is essential to the Parliament; as seen a 
month after the deal with the Council was reached, it delayed the final 
vote on the proposal’s adoption ‘until an agreement [was] reached with 
the ECB ensuring due democratic accountability of the ECB's 
supervisory arm.’81 Finally, the regulations adopted by the Parliament on 
September 12th, as envisioned in Article 17(b) and 17 (c) of the Council 
regulation amended by the Parliament, provide for: 
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arrangements on the practical modalities to exercise scrutiny, including 
on access to information including summaries of discussions in the 
Supervisory Board, cooperation in investigations and information on 
the selection procedure of the Chair of the Supervisory Board.82 
 
The role of national parliaments is strengthened in the regulation’s 
latest amendments, and the adopted regulation ensures that:  
 
The ECB when submitting reports to the European Parliament and the 
Council shall simultaneously forward that report directly to the national 
parliaments of the participating Member States. National parliaments 
may address to the ECB their reasoned observations on that report and 
may request the ECB to reply in writing to any observations or 
questions submitted by them to the ECB in respect of the tasks of the 
ECB.83 
 
  CONCLUSION X.
 
The recent financial and economic crisis has clearly shown that the 
financial market’s integration in the EU requires greater supervision of 
the banking system. However, this example does not necessarily suggest 
that the new level of supervision can only be achieved by transferring 
supervisory competence from the national authorities to EU institutions 
such as the ECB. Some experts have fought for the reinforcement of 
existing national supervision schemes and the improvement of 
communication among these national entities, enabling them to extend 
their supervisory powers to supranational financial activities. However, 
as it has been discussed, this is not the path the European countries 
have chosen. As a matter of fact, they have decided to strengthen the 
ECB’s competence as the ultimate supervisor of the EU banks and 
greatly increase its supervisory power. 
 
There are arguments in support of as well as against the ECB’s 
appropriateness for such a purpose. It is worth mentioning that both 
proponents and detractors’ arguments are rooted in the same line of 
thought. The SSM’s proponents have focused on its legal basis, which is 
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derived from Article 127 of TEFU. Opponents point to the same treaty 
and argue that the existing legal body cannot authorize the extension of 
the ECB’s powers. Those experts who have supported the SSM also 
argue that enforcing monetary policies is not practically possible, 
particularly in times of crisis. Unless the ECB as the monetary policy 
maker was endowed with the power to supervise the banking system 
whose fate is so closely tied to monetary policies’ stability, enforcement 
would not be possible. The SSM’s opponents believe that the 
enforcement of monetary policy should not be mixed with the 
supervision of the banking system as these two roles may require 
incompatible plans of action. 
 
The range of the ECB’s supervisory powers can be discussed from two 
points of view. First, the subject matter over which the ECB has 
jurisdiction has been broadened as its supervisory role is not limited to 
macro-prudential powers, but rather now includes many different 
micro-prudential functions. Although it has been stated that the 
national authorities are still in charge of regulation and supervision at 
the national level, the ECB’s powers allow it to require national entities 
recognize its assessments and obey its demands. Due to the vast scope 
of the ECB’s supervisory authority, there is concern about the overlap 
between the ECB and the EBA’s roles and it is quite possible that the 
EBA will be gradually marginalized.  
 
The personal jurisdiction of the ECB’s prudential powers has also been 
extended. The ECB is now empowered to deal directly with hundreds of 
financial institutions, which are established in the territory of the states 
participating in the SSM. Political matters do influence the ECB’s 
personal jurisdiction to some extent. The German government is not 
willing to relinquish supervisory authority over the German regional 
bank, and it has managed to impose its will on other Member States. 
The Commission and the Council have proposed some solutions for the 
asymmetry of power between the Member States, which join the SSM, 
and those, which opt out of the scheme, and for the unequal treatment 
of states not in the Eurozone. In fact, the Council’s regulation has 
attempted to compensate for these states’ disadvantaged position by 
introducing a new mechanism in the decision making process. Only 
time will tell whether these solutions will be able to strike a balance 
between the ins and outs, or between the Eurozone states and other 
Member States. For now, it can only be predicted that the Eurozone 
2014] European Union Towards the Banking Union  124 
 
Member States will have greater leverage in the ECB’s decision-making 
process.  
 
The ECB will take over as the supervisor of euro area banks in 
November 2014 as part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Alongside 
with the creation of the SSM, the European Parliament has recently 
passed pieces of legislation with the intention to pursue the idea behind 
the creation of the banking union which is ‘making banks safer and 
more transparent, and to lift the burden of bank bailouts from 
taxpayers’ shoulders.’84  This package consists of Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (RRD), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS).  
 
According to these regulations the  
 
basic salary-to-bonus ratio will be raised to curb speculative risk-taking 
by banks. EU banks will also be required to set aside more and better 
capital as a cushion against hard times. The costs of a bailout will be 
absorbed by a bank-financed €55 billion single resolution fund, to be 
established gradually over 8 years.85  
 
However, the efficiency and practicality of these measures in 
complementing the single supervisory mechanism is yet to be 
discovered. Arguably, ‘even if a full framework is implemented, the 
ultimate key to successful reform and financial stability lies in the 
attitude of banks.’86 As has been said, ‘[t]he changes must be matched 
with real willingness by the financial sector to learn from the crisis... 
Any attempt to clean up the financial sector’s malpractices will fail when 
the roulette with people's money is allowed to continue.’ 87
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